Sembcorp Marine Finance Director Sentenced to Prison

Posted by Yuanda Xu.

On Oct. 30, 2014, Sembcorp Marine’s finance director Wee Sing Guan was sentenced to 39 months in prison for falsifying the accounts of the group’s Jurong Shipyard, Sembcorp’s wholly owned unit. The company lost “hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of marked-to-market losses that Wee had incurred on foreign exchange and options trades positions he held with a host of banks, including OCBC Bank, DBS Bank, BNP Paribas (BNP), Societe Generale (SocGen) and Standard Chartered Bank.”

According to criminal law, falsifying account records is an unlawful action. Falsifying records can influence the stock market by making investors believe the company’s stock is worth it to buy. But after a company goes bankrupt, people who hold the stock will lose all their money. The offenses “carry a maximum penalty of an unspecified fine and a seven-year jail term, for each charge.”

Yuanda is a business management major at Montclair State University, Class of 2017.

HSBC Offices Raided Over Money Laundering Allegations

Posted by Connie Huang.

HSBC is a bank with locations in Europe. Two branches raided on or about February 18, 2015 by Swiss authorities are located in Geneva. They raided the banks, because the banks are accused of money laundering.

Money laundering is “a financial transaction scheme that aims to conceal the identity, source, and destination of illicitly-obtained money.” The bank’s Swiss arm was aiding their clients in hiding $100 billion in Swiss accounts, as reported by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). This allowed let them evade taxes.

According to the article, the bank told their clients that it would not divulge to national authorities details of accounts. HSBC talked about “moves that [would] ‘ultimately allow clients to avoid paying taxes in their home countries.’” As said by the ICIJ, HSBC has served clients like Hosni Mubarak, former Egyptian President, the current ruler of Syria Bashar al-Assad, and Ben Ali, the former Tunisian President.

“HSBC Switzerland Offices Raided over Money Laundering Allegations – Feb. 18, 2015.” CNNMoney. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Feb. 2015.

Connie is an international business major at Montclair State University, Class of 2017.

Burglary of Jewelry Store Bungled

Posted by Mihran Naltchayan.

On January 16, 2012 around 1:30am, there was a burglary at a jewelry store named “Taline’s Jewelry” in Edgewater, NJ. Burglary is the breaking and entering into a building with the intent to commit a felony therein.

The jewelry store was arranged with a front display space, and the store next door was empty. The empty store is a big building that wrapped around the backend of the jewelry store. The “Ninja Bandit Burglary Crew” cut into a common wall of the empty store and entered the jewelry store from the backend so nobody can see them from the front side. This crew had three people. They didn’t realize that the walls had a vibration sensor that sends a quiet message to the Edgewater police department. So when the police officers arrived, they tried to run away.

“An Edgewater cop fired at least one shot at a thief who used a police cruiser as a getaway car, after a group of officers interrupted an overnight jewelry store break-in involving an alleged member of the infamous ‘Ninja Bandit’ burglary crew.” (Cliffviewpilot.com). The officers arrested 2 of the 3 people. They found the cop car in Teaneck, New Jersey 9:30 am the same day. The third guy wasn’t found.

The two men were brought to a Municipal Court judge in Edgewater and the judge ordered the defendants to be held on $50,000 bail each; they were charged with burglary, resisting arrest, criminal arrest and possession of burglar tools. (Cliffviewpilot.com).

I wrote about this article because this jewelry store is my father’s, and I thought it would be a good article to use for business law, since we cover criminal law in class.

Mihran is a marketing major at Montclair State University, Class of 2016.

High Court Enters Ruling on Headscarf Case

The High Court rendered an opinion in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. The bottom line is unless the employer can show it is unduly burdensome to accommodate a religious practice, it must accommodate the person even if it has a mandatory dress code or other neutrally-applied policy. The employer is required to do so if the person asks for the accommodation or even if the employer suspects the person may need one.

Abercrombie did not hire a Muslim woman because her headscarf violated their “Look Policy.” The policy, which is described as “East Coast collegiate or preppy style,” prohibits the wearing of “caps” (an undefined term in the policy) as too informal for their image. The woman applied for a job at one of the stores. The assistant manager of the store interviewed and conditionally approved her for the job. Yet, the headscarf she wore to the interview indicated to the manager that hiring her would be a violation of their “Look Policy.” Although the woman never asked for a religious accommodation, the assistant manager assumed that she would need one if hired and deferred to the district manager. The district manager thought the scarf “would violate the Look Policy, as would all other headwear, religious or otherwise,” and directed the assistant manager not to hire the woman.

The EEOC sued on the woman’s behalf claiming Abercrombie’s action violated Title VII and won a $20,000 judgment. The Tenth Circuit reversed and awarded Abercrombie summary judgment, ruling an “employer cannot be liable under Title VII for failing to accommodate a religious practice until the applicant (or employee) provides the employer with actual knowledge of his need for an accommodation.”

Title VII makes it illegal for an employer “‘to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . religion.’ §2000e–2(a)(1).” Religion “includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate [] an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”

There are two ways to bring an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: one is for a disparate- treatment (or intentional-discrimination), and the other, disparate-impact of otherwise facially neutral policies. The “intentional discrimination provision prohibits certain motives, regardless of the state of the actor’s knowledge.” Disparate-treatment claims based on a failure to accommodate a religious practice is plain: “An employer may not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions.”

The Court ruled: “An employer is surely entitled to have, for example, a no-headwear policy as an ordinary matter. But when an applicant requires an accommodation as an ‘aspec[t] of religious . . . practice,’ it is no response that the subsequent ‘fail[ure] . . . to hire’ was due to an otherwise-neutral policy. Title VII requires otherwise-neutral policies to give way to the need for an accommodation.”

Under the ruling, a prospective applicant is not always required, as the Tenth Circuit held, to request an accommodation from an employer. Employers that are aware or believe an accommodation is needed and are motivated to fire or not to hire someone based on that accommodation also violate the statute. As Justice Alito stated in his concurrence, however, if it is unduly burdensome to require the accommodation, then there is no violation.

But Justice Thomas in his dissent was concerned about a broad reading of the words “because of such religious practice” in that it could sweep up an employer’s policy that applies indiscriminately to everyone, yet happens to be at odds with an employee’s religious practice. He gives the following example:

Suppose an employer with a neutral grooming policy forbidding facial hair refuses to hire a Muslim who wears a beard for religious reasons. Assuming the employer applied the neutral grooming policy to all applicants, the motivation behind the refusal to hire the Muslim appli- cant would not be the religious nature of his beard, but its existence. Under the first reading, then, the Muslim applicant would lack an intentional-discrimination claim, as he was not refused employment ‘because of’ the religious nature of his practice. But under the second reading, he would have such a claim, as he was refused employment ‘because of’ a practice that happens to be religious in nature.

Justice Thomas reasoned that under a broad reading employers with no discriminatory motive would be punished because they had no knowledge of every aspect of an employee’s religious practice. It would undermine the intent element of disparate treatment and make the employer strictly liable for its conduct. Citing precedent, Justice Thomas explained “discriminatory purpose” as “‘the purpose necessary for a claim of intentional discrimination” that “demands ‘more than . . . awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.’”

He recognized refusal to accommodate can be discriminatory where an employer does not make a policy exception for someone for religious purposes involving a store policy that is applied to everyone, when at the same time makes the same allowance for someone of another religion or some secular practice. Yet, he explained,”merely refusing to create an exception to a neutral policy for a religious practice cannot be described as treating a particular applicant ‘less favorably than others.’” Under the majority’s view “mere refusal to accommodate a religious practice under a neutral policy could constitute intentional discrimination,” unless the employer produces evidence that the accommodation is unduly burdensome and persuades the court that it is so.

Former General Counsel of South Florida Law Firm Sentenced for Fraud

Posted by Connie Huang.

According to Merriam Webster dictionary, fraud is “the crime of using dishonest methods to take something valuable from another person; a person who pretends to be what he or she is not in order to trick people; [or] a copy of something that is meant to look like the real thing in order to trick people.” Therefore, a person who pretends to be something they’re not in order to trick people and using dishonest ways to take something valuable from someone is fraud.

A former general counsel of a law firm in South Florida was sentenced to 18 months in federal prison. He was sentenced to federal prison because he helped a managing partner  “swindle investors by selling them ‘income’ from faked settlements.” He will probably be testifying against other defendants.

According to the article, defendant’s attorney argued that his client “had been punished enough by losing his New York law license and his home and declaring bankruptcy.” I agree that defendant has been punished enough, because losing one’s ability to work and make money (a law license) and maintain a house is hard on his life as it is. That is a lot to lose. The defendant apologized in court to his family members, which I believe is a rightful thing to do. He has declared he has been guilty to charges relating to wire fraud.

“Former General Counsel of Notorious Rothstein Law Firm Gets 18 Months for Fraud.” ABA Journal. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 Feb. 2015.

Connie is an international business major at Montclair State University, Class of 2017.

EEOC Archives – Blog Business Law – a resource for business law students

The High Court rendered an opinion in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. The bottom line is unless the employer can show it is unduly burdensome to accommodate a religious practice, it must accommodate the person even if it has a mandatory dress code or other neutrally-applied policy. The employer is required to do so if the person asks for the accommodation or even if the employer suspects the person may need one.

Abercrombie did not hire a Muslim woman because her headscarf violated their “Look Policy.” The policy, which is described as “East Coast collegiate or preppy style,” prohibits the wearing of “caps” (an undefined term in the policy) as too informal for their image. The woman applied for a job at one of the stores. The assistant manager of the store interviewed and conditionally approved her for the job. Yet, the headscarf she wore to the interview indicated to the manager that hiring her would be a violation of their “Look Policy.” Although the woman never asked for a religious accommodation, the assistant manager assumed that she would need one if hired and deferred to the district manager. The district manager thought the scarf “would violate the Look Policy, as would all other headwear, religious or otherwise,” and directed the assistant manager not to hire the woman.

The EEOC sued on the woman’s behalf claiming Abercrombie’s action violated Title VII and won a $20,000 judgment. The Tenth Circuit reversed and awarded Abercrombie summary judgment, ruling an “employer cannot be liable under Title VII for failing to accommodate a religious practice until the applicant (or employee) provides the employer with actual knowledge of his need for an accommodation.”

Title VII makes it illegal for an employer “‘to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . religion.’ §2000e–2(a)(1).” Religion “includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate [] an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”

There are two ways to bring an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: one is for a disparate- treatment (or intentional-discrimination), and the other, disparate-impact of otherwise facially neutral policies. The “intentional discrimination provision prohibits certain motives, regardless of the state of the actor’s knowledge.” Disparate-treatment claims based on a failure to accommodate a religious practice is plain: “An employer may not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions.”

The Court ruled: “An employer is surely entitled to have, for example, a no-headwear policy as an ordinary matter. But when an applicant requires an accommodation as an ‘aspec[t] of religious . . . practice,’ it is no response that the subsequent ‘fail[ure] . . . to hire’ was due to an otherwise-neutral policy. Title VII requires otherwise-neutral policies to give way to the need for an accommodation.”

Under the ruling, a prospective applicant is not always required, as the Tenth Circuit held, to request an accommodation from an employer. Employers that are aware or believe an accommodation is needed and are motivated to fire or not to hire someone based on that accommodation also violate the statute. As Justice Alito stated in his concurrence, however, if it is unduly burdensome to require the accommodation, then there is no violation.

But Justice Thomas in his dissent was concerned about a broad reading of the words “because of such religious practice” in that it could sweep up an employer’s policy that applies indiscriminately to everyone, yet happens to be at odds with an employee’s religious practice. He gives the following example:

Suppose an employer with a neutral grooming policy forbidding facial hair refuses to hire a Muslim who wears a beard for religious reasons. Assuming the employer applied the neutral grooming policy to all applicants, the motivation behind the refusal to hire the Muslim appli- cant would not be the religious nature of his beard, but its existence. Under the first reading, then, the Muslim applicant would lack an intentional-discrimination claim, as he was not refused employment ‘because of’ the religious nature of his practice. But under the second reading, he would have such a claim, as he was refused employment ‘because of’ a practice that happens to be religious in nature.

Justice Thomas reasoned that under a broad reading employers with no discriminatory motive would be punished because they had no knowledge of every aspect of an employee’s religious practice. It would undermine the intent element of disparate treatment and make the employer strictly liable for its conduct. Citing precedent, Justice Thomas explained “discriminatory purpose” as “‘the purpose necessary for a claim of intentional discrimination” that “demands ‘more than . . . awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.’”

He recognized refusal to accommodate can be discriminatory where an employer does not make a policy exception for someone for religious purposes involving a store policy that is applied to everyone, when at the same time makes the same allowance for someone of another religion or some secular practice. Yet, he explained,”merely refusing to create an exception to a neutral policy for a religious practice cannot be described as treating a particular applicant ‘less favorably than others.’” Under the majority’s view “mere refusal to accommodate a religious practice under a neutral policy could constitute intentional discrimination,” unless the employer produces evidence that the accommodation is unduly burdensome and persuades the court that it is so.

Posted by Stephanie Simms.

In this article, Ruby Tuesday is facing a civil rights lawsuit for discriminating against male job candidates. The government is suing on behalf of, Andrew Herrera, who worked at an Oregon Ruby Tuesday, and Joshua Bell, who worked at a Ruby Tuesday in Republic, Missouri. They were only allowed to work there for a temporary period of time. What makes the situation worse for Ruby Tuesday is they specifically had an internal job posting that stated only girls should apply to their restaurant. The law of discrimination based on gender states that, employers are prohibited from classifying jobs based on gender, unless employer can prove gender is essential to the job.

The government’s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission lawsuit was filed in the federal district court in Oregon. The lawsuit explains how the postings which were passed around to stores within nine states, and their content is a violation to the Equal Opportunity Employment laws from the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991. EEOC San Francisco Regional Attorney William R. Tamayo stated, “It’s rare to see an explicit example of sex discrimination like Ruby Tuesday’s internal job announcement. . . . This suit is a cautionary tale to employers that sex-based employment decisions are rarely justified and are not consistent with good business judgment.” Everyone is entitled a fair chance when it comes to jobs, because one cannot just tell someone they cannot work somewhere without putting them up to the task. Both of the men say they were denied the opportunity to earn more money because they were not allowed to compete for the jobs.

In the end, Ruby Tuesday hired seven women and no men for the 2013 summer jobs. EEOC’s Seattle Field Office Director, Nancy Sienko said, “[Mr. Herrera] was shocked and angered that Ruby Tuesday would categorically exclude him and other male employees” from a lucrative job. The job announcement was distributed to restaurants located in Oregon, Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada and Utah.

The lawsuit does not indicate exactly how much in damages the men were seeking for the discrimination due to their gender.

Stephanie is business administration with a minor in biology at Montclair State University, Class of 2017.

Hungary for Love: The Battle For Copyright Protection

Posted by Arleen Frias-Arias.

After reviewing an article posted December 16, 2014 by Madeline Boardman for Us Magazine, I found interesting the development of this case. A singer named Mitsou is suing singers and celebrities Beyoncé and Jay Z, for mismanagement and stealing. The Hungarian singer has a song called “Bajba, Bajba Pelem,” which allegedly Beyoncé and her team took from her song and sampled Mitsou’s vocals for the single “Drunken in Love.”

The interesting part is that Mitsou has never exactly signed papers that would permit anyone to use her voice for any type of use, including trade purposes. According to New York Post’s Page Six, the voice of Mitsou was manipulated for sexual erotica purposes without her permission. According to Mitsou her voice is featured in the overall song for about 1.5 minutes. This could be a huge problem for Jay-Z’s company and Beyoncé as an artist, because after hearing both sides and songs, there is a huge similarity between songs.

In my opinion, this case will require plenty of experts to prove the guilty actions of singer Beyoncé and Jay-Z. Even though the song only has a couple seconds of the actual voice of Mitsou, there are heavy accusations being made. Beyoncé has not yet commented on the situation but I think in this situation is where we bring in copyrights and hard evidence to prove statements.

In enforcing copyrights against the defendant there needs to be a letter of warning, enlisting the acts of infringements. Now since there were not any responses by the infringing party, legal actions are acceptable at this point. According to John Hornick of Finnegan.com, the business law rules most copyrights depend on is whether or not the copyright was even registered with the United States at the time of the defendants acts.

I believe Mitsou will have to file a copyright infringement lawsuit seeking compensatory harms. This situation is a very sensitive especially if Beyoncé is found liable; there could be over thousands of dollars probably billions returned to Mitsou for her work being unfairly taken without permission.

Arleen is a marketing and communication/TV production major at Montclair State University, Class of 2018.

How Do I Declare Bankruptcy?

Posted by Orintia Daniels.

Bankrupt: “(of a person or organization) declared in law unable to pay outstanding debts.” According to dictionary.com, this adjective simply means that a particular person or organization is in debt and owes money to another organization or person. I have came across an article called “How do I declare Bankruptcy?” which explains the various forms of bankrutpcy as well as how someone can actually declare bankruptcy.

Let’s talk chapters! No, not just any chapters; specifically, let’s review Chapters 7, 11, and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Let’s explain, starting with Chapter 7.

Have you ever heard the term “Everything must go?” Well, Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, states that whoever files under that chapter might lose everything. For example, a person may lose his or her home, due to not being able to pay the bank their debts. Chapter 7 “liquidates your assets to pay off as much of your debt as possible. When it is all done, you are left with the least debt possible, but you usually have to sacrifice a number of possessions along the way to make that happen.” (HG.org).

On the other hand Chapter 11 is mainly for businesses, such as corporations and partnerships, but can be available to individuals. It has no limits on the amount of debt, as Chapter 13 does. It is the usual choice for large businesses seeking to restructure their debt. Under Chapter 13, the Code:

allows the filer to reorganize their debt, making it more manageable. Under a Chapter13 bankruptcy, the debtor is able pay off their debts over a period of three to five years. For filers with consistent, predictable incomes, a Chapter 13 bankruptcy may be a great way out of debt by creating a sort of legal grace period. If the debtor makes all payments required under the bankruptcy order, and there are still debts remaining at the end of the grace period, those debts are discharged” (HG.org).

Overall, Chapter 13, is primarily for personal struggles, by anyone who may not be able to pay off their debts.

For one to declare bankruptcy, there are two main methods: as an individual, which is to voluntarily file for bankruptcy, or wait for creditors to ask the court to declare you bankrupt. To further understand the different ways to file for bankruptcy and the different forms of bankruptcy, I personally suggest that you continue your interest on the following website.

Orintia is a marketing major with a minor in economics at Montclair State University, Class of 2017.

Protecting the First Amendment

Posted by Danielle Lindsay Feoranzo.

In the United States, freedom of speech is protected by the First Amendment. It is a prized right and the courts have protected this right to the fullest extent. As Americans in a democratic country, we have the power to speak our minds to ensure we can voice our political opinions and criticize government actions or policies. Thus, as citizens we hold great authority for which could either positively and or negatively influence our country’s future.

In today’s world, social media has made a strong precedence in our community and the functionality of our world. This includes Twitter, Instagram, Tumbler, and the heavy-weight, Facebook. These outlets of social media can be used by famous celebrities to endorse a product, or politicians to promote themselves and their campaigns. Social media is an outlet that can connect one with the world, therefore in essence is a huge stage to express oneself and one’s opinions.

It was on June 1, 2015, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a Pennsylvania man who posted many violent messages on Facebook (the Court raising implications of freedom of speech). However, prior to the Supreme Court hearing the case, the man was convicted under a federal threat statue and sentenced to jail time of forty-four months. The man appealed this judgment, stating the government should have been required to prove he actually intended to make a threat. The Pennsylvania man argued he was exercising his freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. He also mentioned he was inspired by the artist Eminem and his lyrics for which is recited and had no intention to threaten anyone.

The Supreme Court ruled in his favor and stated, “It was not enough to convict the man based solely on the idea that a reasonable person would regard the communications as a threat” (Ariane de Vogue, CNN). What is important to take notice is the “reasonable person” standard was rejected by the Court. This is because the government needed to prove the defendant’s intent.

To conclude, the Pennsylvania man expressed himself on Facebook, whether it was crude to some or not, it did not uphold in court as a threat. This case is another example of how the Court will go out of its way to protect speech under the First Amendment.

Danielle is a business administration major with a concentration in management information and technology at Montclair State University, Class of 2016.

FIFA–Russia and Qatar May Be Stripped of Hosting World Cups

FIFA’s Audit and Compliance Committee head, Domenico Scala, said if evidence shows Russia and Qatar bought votes to have the World Cup hosted in their country, ‘the awards could be invalidated.’” This comes on the heels of U.S. federal indictments charging FIFA officials with racketeering, conspiracy, and corruption.

Russia and Qatar are not the subject of those indictments, but evidence may emerge from those proceedings about how they won the privilege of hosting the event.